Acting intentionally in Frames

Ekaterina Gabrovska and Wilhelm Geuder

CRC 991, Heinrich Heine University, Düsseldorf

- Adverbs expressing intentionality are:
 - in English: intentionally, deliberately, consciously, purposely, a.o.
 - in German: *absichtlich* ('intentionally'), *bewusst* ('consciously'), *versehentlich* ('accidentally')
- These modifiers contribute to agentivity distinctions
 - a. Mary coughed.
 - b. Mary coughed *intentionally*.
- They are a subclass of mental-attitude adverbs.
- They behave like VP-adverbs, and seem to function as Davidsonian event adverbs (e.g. Landman 2000).
- We concentrate for the moment on German *absichtlich*.

- Adverbs expressing intentionality are:
 - in English: intentionally, deliberately, consciously, purposely, a.o.
 - in German: *absichtlich* ('intentionally'), *bewusst* ('consciously'), *versehentlich* ('accidentally')
- These modifiers contribute to agentivity distinctions
- (1) a. Mary coughed.
 - b. Mary coughed *intentionally*.
 - They are a subclass of mental-attitude adverbs.
 - They behave like VP-adverbs, and seem to function as Davidsonian event adverbs (e.g. Landman 2000).
 - We concentrate for the moment on German *absichtlich*.

- Adverbs expressing intentionality are:
 - in English: intentionally, deliberately, consciously, purposely, a.o.
 - in German: *absichtlich* ('intentionally'), *bewusst* ('consciously'), *versehentlich* ('accidentally')
- These modifiers contribute to agentivity distinctions
- (1) a. Mary coughed.
 - b. Mary coughed *intentionally*.
 - They are a subclass of mental-attitude adverbs.
 - They behave like VP-adverbs, and seem to function as Davidsonian event adverbs (e.g. Landman 2000).
 - We concentrate for the moment on German *absichtlich*.

- Adverbs expressing intentionality are:
 - in English: intentionally, deliberately, consciously, purposely, a.o.
 - in German: *absichtlich* ('intentionally'), *bewusst* ('consciously'), *versehentlich* ('accidentally')
- These modifiers contribute to agentivity distinctions
- (1) a. Mary coughed.
 - b. Mary coughed *intentionally*.
 - They are a subclass of mental-attitude adverbs.
 - They behave like VP-adverbs, and seem to function as Davidsonian event adverbs (e.g. Landman 2000).
 - We concentrate for the moment on German absichtlich.

- Adverbs expressing intentionality are:
 - in English: intentionally, deliberately, consciously, purposely, a.o.
 - in German: *absichtlich* ('intentionally'), *bewusst* ('consciously'), *versehentlich* ('accidentally')
- These modifiers contribute to agentivity distinctions
- (1) a. Mary coughed.
 - b. Mary coughed *intentionally*.
 - They are a subclass of mental-attitude adverbs.
 - They behave like VP-adverbs, and seem to function as Davidsonian event adverbs (e.g. Landman 2000).
 - We concentrate for the moment on German absichtlich.

Outline

- 1. Why adverbs of intentionality?
- 2. A semantics for 'absichtlich'/'intentionally'
- 3. A Frame model for 'acting absichtlich'
- 3.1 History of the idea: Goldman (1970) on action-plans and level-generation
- 3.2 A Frame version: cascades, and action-plans as attributes
- 4. Going for the opposite: 'versehentlich A'

Why adverbs of intentionality?

- Reason: We see intentional adverbials as activating components of an event which otherwise remain hidden.
- Goal:
 - to explain the behavior of modifiers, like e.g. the adverb absichtlich;
 - to uncover structures in the meaning of action verbs.

- Reason: We see intentional adverbials as activating components of an event which otherwise remain hidden.
- Goal:
 - to explain the behavior of modifiers, like e.g. the adverb absichtlich;
 - to uncover structures in the meaning of action verbs.

- Reason: We see intentional adverbials as activating components of an event which otherwise remain hidden.
- Goal:
 - to explain the behavior of modifiers, like e.g. the adverb absichtlich;
 - to uncover structures in the meaning of action verbs.

- Our approach: to model intentionality as attributes in an event description, but as a domain that differs from the realm called *manner*.
- Our plan:
 - First to examine the meaning contribution of *absichtlich*.
 - Then to show how this contribution can be captured using Frame Semantics.

- Our approach: to model intentionality as attributes in an event description, but as a domain that differs from the realm called *manner*.
- Our plan:
 - First to examine the meaning contribution of *absichtlich*.
 - Then to show how this contribution can be captured using Frame Semantics.

- Our approach: to model intentionality as attributes in an event description, but as a domain that differs from the realm called *manner*.
- Our plan:
 - First to examine the meaning contribution of *absichtlich*.
 - Then to show how this contribution can be captured using Frame Semantics.

A semantics for 'absichtlich'/'intentionally'

The meaning of 'absichtlich'

- A is done intentionally is **not** true by virtue of x having the (previous) intention to do A
- (2) I have the intention to turn on the light. Therefore I flip the switch.– In the end...
 - a. I have turned on the light $\sqrt{as} \ I \ had \ planned / \# intentionally$.
 - b. I have flipped the switch *intentionally*.
- (3) Ich habe die Absicht das Licht anzumachen. Daher betätige ich den Schalter. – Am Ende...
 - a. Ich habe das Licht \checkmark wie geplannt/#absichtlich angemacht.
 - b. Ich habe den Schalter absichtlich betätigt.

The meaning of 'absichtlich'

- A is done intentionally is **not** true by virtue of x having the (previous) intention to do A
- (2) I have the intention to turn on the light. Therefore I flip the switch.- In the end...
 - a. I have turned on the light $\sqrt{as I had planned}/\#intentionally$.
 - b. I have flipped the switch *intentionally*.
- (3) Ich habe die Absicht das Licht anzumachen. Daher betätige ich den Schalter. – Am Ende...
 - a. Ich habe das Licht \checkmark wie geplannt/#absichtlich angemacht.
 - b. Ich habe den Schalter absichtlich betätigt.

The meaning of 'absichtlich'

- A is done intentionally is **not** true by virtue of x having the (previous) intention to do A
- (2) I have the intention to turn on the light. Therefore I flip the switch.- In the end...
 - a. I have turned on the light $\sqrt{as I}$ had planned/#intentionally.
 - b. I have flipped the switch *intentionally*.
- (3) Ich habe die Absicht das Licht anzumachen. Daher betätige ich den Schalter. – Am Ende...
 - a. Ich habe das Licht √ *wie geplannt/#absichtlich* angemacht.
 - b. Ich habe den Schalter absichtlich betätigt.

• *intentionally* is not the opposite of *spontaneously*

-) a. I intend to apply for that position #I applied intentionally (#...as I had told you I would)
 - b. I didn't intend to buy chocolate #I didn't buy it intentionally (does not refer to your shopping list)
- → Hence, an action A is *absichtlich* if it is done in a connection to an intention. However, A is not the content of the intention, it is a means to realize the intention.

- *intentionally* is not the opposite of *spontaneously*
- (4) a. I intend to apply for that position #I applied intentionally (#...as I had told you I would)
 - b. I didn't intend to buy chocolate #I didn't buy it intentionally (does not refer to your shopping list)
 - → Hence, an action A is *absichtlich* if it is done in a connection to an intention. However, A is not the content of the intention, it is a means to realize the intention.

- intentionally is not the opposite of spontaneously
- (4) a. I intend to apply for that position #I applied intentionally (#...as I had told you I would)
 - b. I didn't intend to buy chocolate #I didn't buy it intentionally (does not refer to your shopping list)
 - \rightarrow Hence, an action A is *absichtlich* if it is done in a connection to an intention. However, A is not the content of the intention, it is a means to realize the intention.

- *absichtlich A* is **not** true by virtue of *x is doing A consciously* (but this seems possible for *intentionally*)
- 5) a. During the 45-minute session, we stretched and lengthened, relaxed and extended, focused and let go. And we breathed – intentionally and deeply – as our instructor encouraged us to.¹
 - b. Und wir atmeten *absichtlich/√ bewusst...
 and we breathed intentionally/consciously

ightarrow Absichtlich cannot apply to 'idle behavior', whereas intentionally may.

¹http://www.theghoshcenter.org/experience-the-benefits-of-chair-yoga/

- *absichtlich A* is **not** true by virtue of *x is doing A consciously* (but this seems possible for *intentionally*)
- (5) a. During the 45-minute session, we stretched and lengthened, relaxed and extended, focused and let go. And we breathed – *intentionally* and deeply – as our instructor encouraged us to.¹
 - b. Und wir atmeten *absichtlich/√ bewusst... and we breathed intentionally/consciously

ightarrow Absichtlich cannot apply to 'idle behavior', whereas intentionally may.

¹http://www.theghoshcenter.org/experience-the-benefits-of-chair-yoga/

- *absichtlich A* is **not** true by virtue of *x is doing A consciously* (but this seems possible for *intentionally*)
- (5) a. During the 45-minute session, we stretched and lengthened, relaxed and extended, focused and let go. And we breathed – *intentionally* and deeply – as our instructor encouraged us to.¹
 - b. Und wir atmeten *absichtlich/√ bewusst... and we breathed intentionally/consciously
 - \rightarrow Absichtlich cannot apply to 'idle behavior', whereas intentionally may.

¹http://www.theghoshcenter.org/experience-the-benefits-of-chair-yoga/

• *absichtlich* is not entirely different from the meaning of *intentionally*:

- The effects in (2) and (3) are parallel.
- However, *absichtlich* refers to a different section of the global concept 'intentionality'.
- → Conclusion: The most important building block in the meaning of (at least) absichtlich is the existence of an intention with which A is done, i.e. a further purpose that doing A serves.

• *absichtlich* is not entirely different from the meaning of *intentionally*:

- The effects in (2) and (3) are parallel.
- However, *absichtlich* refers to a different section of the global concept 'intentionality'.
- → Conclusion: The most important building block in the meaning of (at least) absichtlich is the existence of an intention with which A is done, i.e. a further purpose that doing A serves.

- *absichtlich* is not entirely different from the meaning of *intentionally*:
 - The effects in (2) and (3) are parallel.
 - However, *absichtlich* refers to a different section of the global concept 'intentionality'.
- → Conclusion: The most important building block in the meaning of (at least) absichtlich is the existence of an intention with which A is done, i.e. a further purpose that doing A serves.


- *absichtlich* is not entirely different from the meaning of *intentionally*:
 - The effects in (2) and (3) are parallel.
 - However, *absichtlich* refers to a different section of the global concept 'intentionality'.
- → Conclusion: The most important building block in the meaning of (at least) absichtlich is the existence of an intention with which A is done, i.e. a further purpose that doing A serves.

A Frame model for 'acting absichtlich'

History of the idea: Goldman (1970) on action-plans and level-generation


Goldman's (1970) theory of action

- Goldman (1970) organizes context dependent categorizations of a doing in *act-trees*.
- *Level-generation* is a conceptual relation which, under circumstances, relates two acts A and A', if A' is done *by* or *in* doing A (Goldman 1970, Löbner ms.).
- The tree on the right can be seen as conceptualization of a doing.




Goldman's (1970) theory of action

- Goldman (1970) organizes context dependent categorizations of a doing in *act-trees*.
- Level-generation is a conceptual relation which, under circumstances, relates two acts A and A', if A' is done by or in doing A (Goldman 1970, Löbner ms.).
- The tree on the right can be seen as conceptualization of a doing.



Goldman's (1970) theory of action

- Goldman (1970) organizes context dependent categorizations of a doing in *act-trees*.
- Level-generation is a conceptual relation which, under circumstances, relates two acts A and A', if A' is done by or in doing A (Goldman 1970, Löbner ms.).
- The tree on the right can be seen as conceptualization of a doing.



- are Goldman's (1970) mechanism to capture intentional actions;
- consist of the action-want of the agent and her beliefs concerning the realization of the target of the action-want (1970: 56)
 - The action-want (desire or aversion) of an agent is the want to do a certain act (1970: 50).
 - Beliefs are hypothetical acts of an agent (1970: 56).
- "Whatever act is performed [...] as long as it is performed *in the way conceived in the action-plan*, is intentional" (Goldman 1970: 59)

- are Goldman's (1970) mechanism to capture intentional actions;
- consist of the action-want of the agent and her beliefs concerning the realization of the target of the action-want (1970: 56)
 - The action-want (desire or aversion) of an agent is the want to do a certain act (1970: 50).
 - Beliefs are hypothetical acts of an agent (1970: 56).
- "Whatever act is performed [...] as long as it is performed *in the way conceived in the action-plan*, is intentional" (Goldman 1970: 59)

- are Goldman's (1970) mechanism to capture intentional actions;
- consist of the action-want of the agent and her beliefs concerning the realization of the target of the action-want (1970: 56)
 - The action-want (desire or aversion) of an agent is the want to do a certain act (1970: 50).
 - Beliefs are hypothetical acts of an agent (1970: 56).
- "Whatever act is performed [...] as long as it is performed *in the way conceived in the action-plan*, is intentional" (Goldman 1970: 59)

- are Goldman's (1970) mechanism to capture intentional actions;
- consist of the action-want of the agent and her beliefs concerning the realization of the target of the action-want (1970: 56)
 - The action-want (desire or aversion) of an agent is the want to do a certain act (1970: 50).
 - Beliefs are hypothetical acts of an agent (1970: 56).
- "Whatever act is performed [...] as long as it is performed *in the way conceived in the action-plan*, is intentional" (Goldman 1970: 59)

Action-plans:

- are Goldman's (1970) mechanism to capture intentional actions;
- consist of the action-want of the agent and her beliefs concerning the realization of the target of the action-want (1970: 56)
 - The action-want (desire or aversion) of an agent is the want to do a certain act (1970: 50).
 - Beliefs are hypothetical acts of an agent (1970: 56).
- "Whatever act is performed [...] as long as it is performed *in the way conceived in the action-plan*, is intentional" (Goldman 1970: 59)

Intentional action




Figure 1: *Projected act-tree* (left) and an *Act-tree* (right) which do not replicate each other completely

- Intentional adverbs fix the interpretation of verbs which otherwise can be understood as intentional or not (cf. Buscher 2016).
- Whenever the agent has an action-plan matching the execution of the action, the latter is intentional.
- If the plan does not match the execution of the action on all levels, then the respective events on the act-tree are not intentional.
- → Intentional adverbs introduce the action-plan of the agent of an action.
 They also provide information with respect to the matching relation between the plan and the action.

- Intentional adverbs fix the interpretation of verbs which otherwise can be understood as intentional or not (cf. Buscher 2016).
- Whenever the agent has an action-plan matching the execution of the action, the latter is intentional.
- If the plan does not match the execution of the action on all levels, then the respective events on the act-tree are not intentional.
- → Intentional adverbs introduce the action-plan of the agent of an action.
 They also provide information with respect to the matching relation between the plan and the action.

- Intentional adverbs fix the interpretation of verbs which otherwise can be understood as intentional or not (cf. Buscher 2016).
- Whenever the agent has an action-plan matching the execution of the action, the latter is intentional.
- If the plan does not match the execution of the action on all levels, then the respective events on the act-tree are not intentional.
- → Intentional adverbs introduce the action-plan of the agent of an action.
 They also provide information with respect to the matching relation between the plan and the action.

- Intentional adverbs fix the interpretation of verbs which otherwise can be understood as intentional or not (cf. Buscher 2016).
- Whenever the agent has an action-plan matching the execution of the action, the latter is intentional.
- If the plan does not match the execution of the action on all levels, then the respective events on the act-tree are not intentional.
- \rightarrow Intentional adverbs introduce the action-plan of the agent of an action. They also provide information with respect to the matching relation between the plan and the action.

A Frame model for 'acting absichtlich'

A Frame version: cascades, and action-plans as attributes

Frames

Frames are:

- the universal format of representation in human cognition (cf. Barsalou 1992, Löbner 2017);
- first-order attribute-value structures with exclusively functional attributes (Petersen 2007, Löbner 2017);




Figure 2: Example frame for a 'red lolly with a green stick' as in Petersen (2007: 14 47, Figure 2)

Frames

Frames are:

- the universal format of representation in human cognition (cf. Barsalou 1992, Löbner 2017);
- first-order attribute-value structures with exclusively functional attributes (Petersen 2007, Löbner 2017);




Figure 2: Example frame for a 'red lolly with a green stick' as in Petersen (2007: 47, Figure 2)

Frames

Frames are:

- the universal format of representation in human cognition (cf. Barsalou 1992, Löbner 2017);
- first-order attribute-value structures with exclusively functional attributes (Petersen 2007, Löbner 2017);





Figure 2: Example frame for a 'red lolly with a green stick' as in Petersen (2007: 14 47, Figure 2)


- is a general term capturing Goldman's act-structures;
- are seen as a simultaneous categorization in a hierarchical structure;
- make use of the c-constitution relation (a conceptual relation between types);
- are second-order structures based on first-order frames.

b) John winkt Mary zu.b) 'John waves at Mary.'




- is a general term capturing Goldman's act-structures;
- are seen as a simultaneous categorization in a hierarchical structure;
- make use of the c-constitution relation (a conceptual relation between types);
- are second-order structures based on first-order frames.

b) John winkt Mary zu.'John waves at Mary.'




- is a general term capturing Goldman's act-structures;
- are seen as a simultaneous
 categorization in a hierarchical structure;
- make use of the c-constitution relation (a conceptual relation between types);
- are second-order structures based on first-order frames.

b) John winkt Mary zu.'John waves at Mary.'




- is a general term capturing Goldman's act-structures;
- are seen as a simultaneous
 categorization in a hierarchical structure;
- make use of the c-constitution relation (a conceptual relation between types);
- are second-order structures based on first-order frames.

b) John winkt Mary zu.'John waves at Mary.'



- is a general term capturing Goldman's act-structures;
- are seen as a simultaneous categorization in a hierarchical structure;
- make use of the c-constitution relation (a conceptual relation between types);
- are second-order structures based on first-order frames.

(6) John winkt Mary zu.'John waves at Mary.'



- Action-plans are represented as cascades too.
- Intentional adverbs:
 - introduce the action-plan of the agent;
 - state whether there is a matching between levels of the action-plan tree and the act-tree of the agent.
- \rightarrow We need a representation of actions which provides an action cascade as well as an action-plan cascade.

- Action-plans are represented as cascades too.
- Intentional adverbs:
 - introduce the action-plan of the agent;
 - state whether there is a matching between levels of the action-plan tree and the act-tree of the agent.
- ightarrow We need a representation of actions which provides an action cascade as well as an action-plan cascade.

- Action-plans are represented as cascades too.
- Intentional adverbs:
 - introduce the action-plan of the agent;
 - state whether there is a matching between levels of the action-plan tree and the act-tree of the agent.
- → We need a representation of actions which provides an action cascade as well as an action-plan cascade.

- Action-plans are represented as cascades too.
- Intentional adverbs:
 - introduce the action-plan of the agent;
 - state whether there is a matching between levels of the action-plan tree and the act-tree of the agent.
- $\rightarrow\,$ We need a representation of actions which provides an action cascade as well as an action-plan cascade.

- The frame representation of an intentional action has to involve the attributes PLAN (action-plan) and EXECUTION.
- It involves a new type for actions inspired by the idea of Dowty's (1979) DO.
- That the action-plan and the execution match is modeled via comparators (2-place attributes returning comparison values, cf. Löbner (2017)).

- The frame representation of an intentional action has to involve the attributes PLAN (action-plan) and EXECUTION.
- It involves a new type for actions inspired by the idea of Dowty's (1979) DO.
- That the action-plan and the execution match is modeled via comparators (2-place attributes returning comparison values, cf. Löbner (2017)).

- The frame representation of an intentional action has to involve the attributes PLAN (action-plan) and EXECUTION.
- It involves a new type for actions inspired by the idea of Dowty's (1979) DO.
- That the action-plan and the execution match is modeled via comparators (2-place attributes returning comparison values, cf. Löbner (2017)).

Modeling 'absichtlich A'





Figure 4: Generalized frame representation of intentional action

Modeling 'absichtlich A': an example

(7) Ich habe ihm absichtlich zugewunken.'I waved at him intentionally.'



- *Absichtlich* A (an execution-cascade) is true if A is a proper part of the plan value.
- In this *absichtlich* has a meaning that is narrower than English *intentionally* as argued above.
- *Absichtlich* is an event modifier, but not a manner modifier.
- Manner modifiers are assumed to enforce changes in the execution track only.

- *Absichtlich* A (an execution-cascade) is true if A is a proper part of the plan value.
- In this *absichtlich* has a meaning that is narrower than English *intentionally* as argued above.
- *Absichtlich* is an event modifier, but not a manner modifier.
- Manner modifiers are assumed to enforce changes in the execution track only.

- *Absichtlich* A (an execution-cascade) is true if A is a proper part of the plan value.
- In this *absichtlich* has a meaning that is narrower than English *intentionally* as argued above.
- Absichtlich is an event modifier, but not a manner modifier.
- Manner modifiers are assumed to enforce changes in the execution track only.

- *Absichtlich* A (an execution-cascade) is true if A is a proper part of the plan value.
- In this *absichtlich* has a meaning that is narrower than English *intentionally* as argued above.
- Absichtlich is an event modifier, but not a manner modifier.
- Manner modifiers are assumed to enforce changes in the execution track only.

Going for the opposite: 'versehentlich A'

• Versehentlich is difficult to translate in English.

- *unintentionally*? No, there is also *unabsichtlich*.
- *accidentally*? Yes, but a responsible agent is needed, i.e. we need an action.
- inadvertently? Yes, but it does not cover the sense of unexpectedly.
- Given the frame for *absichtlich* A, how can we represent *versehentlich* A:

• Versehentlich is difficult to translate in English.

- unintentionally? No, there is also unabsichtlich.
- *accidentally*? Yes, but a responsible agent is needed, i.e. we need an action.
- *inadvertently*? Yes, but it does not cover the sense of *unexpectedly*.
- Given the frame for *absichtlich* A, how can we represent *versehentlich* A:

- Versehentlich is difficult to translate in English.
 - unintentionally? No, there is also unabsichtlich.
 - *accidentally*? Yes, but a responsible agent is needed, i.e. we need an action.
 - *inadvertently*? Yes, but it does not cover the sense of *unexpectedly*.
- Given the frame for *absichtlich* A, how can we represent *versehentlich* A:

- Versehentlich is difficult to translate in English.
 - unintentionally? No, there is also unabsichtlich.
 - *accidentally*? Yes, but a responsible agent is needed, i.e. we need an action.
 - inadvertently? Yes, but it does not cover the sense of unexpectedly.
- Given the frame for *absichtlich* A, how can we represent *versehentlich* A:


- Versehentlich is difficult to translate in English.
 - unintentionally? No, there is also unabsichtlich.
 - *accidentally*? Yes, but a responsible agent is needed, i.e. we need an action.
 - *inadvertently*? Yes, but it does not cover the sense of *unexpectedly*.
- Given the frame for *absichtlich* A, how can we represent *versehentlich* A:

- Versehentlich is difficult to translate in English.
 - unintentionally? No, there is also unabsichtlich.
 - *accidentally*? Yes, but a responsible agent is needed, i.e. we need an action.
 - inadvertently? Yes, but it does not cover the sense of unexpectedly.
- Given the frame for *absichtlich* A, how can we represent *versehentlich* A:
 - $\rightarrow\,$ A plan is involved but is not congruent with the execution.

(8) In the elevator Bill and John are having a discussion. Bill pushes the button for the 3rd floor and turns around to face John. While turning around:

Bill hat versehentlich die Knöpfe mit seinem Rucksack gedrückt.

'Bill pushed the buttons with his backpack accidentally.'




- \rightarrow We hypothesize that *versehentlich* A generally means that A is embedded in a larger action concept.
 - The branching used for the representation of example (7) is already known from Goldman (1970).

- \rightarrow We hypothesize that versehentlich A generally means that A is embedded in a larger action concept.
 - The branching used for the representation of example (7) is already known from Goldman (1970).

Modeling 'versehentlich A'

(9) Bill hat versehentlich 6. Stock gedrückt.'Bill pushed the 6th floor button accidentally.'



- Differences:
 - In (8) the *versehentlich* A differs from the planned one in the value of an attribute.
 - This corresponds to the placement of focus in the example.
- Commonalities:
 - In both case the *versehentlich* A is generated by an act which is executed as planned.
 - However, *versehentlich* A itself is outside the scope of that plan.

- Differences:
 - In (8) the *versehentlich* A differs from the planned one in the value of an attribute.
 - This corresponds to the placement of focus in the example.
- Commonalities:
 - In both case the *versehentlich* A is generated by an act which is executed as planned.
 - However, *versehentlich* A itself is outside the scope of that plan.

- Differences:
 - In (8) the *versehentlich* A differs from the planned one in the value of an attribute.
 - This corresponds to the placement of focus in the example.
- Commonalities:
 - In both case the *versehentlich* A is generated by an act which is executed as planned.
 - However, versehentlich A itself is outside the scope of that plan.

- Differences:
 - In (8) the *versehentlich* A differs from the planned one in the value of an attribute.
 - This corresponds to the placement of focus in the example.
- Commonalities:
 - In both case the *versehentlich* A is generated by an act which is executed as planned.
 - However, versehentlich A itself is outside the scope of that plan.

This slide intentionally left blank!

Some References

- Barsalou, L. W. 1992. Frames, concepts, and conceptual fields. In A. Lehrer, E. F. Kittay (Eds.), Frames, fields, and contrasts: New essays in semantic and lexical organization, pp. 21–74. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Buscher, F. 2016. Kompositionalität und ihre Freiräume: Zur flexiblen Interpretation von Einstellungsadverbialen. Dissertation, Universität Tübingen.
- Dowty, D. R. 1979. Word Meaning and Montague Grammar. Dordrecht/Boston/London: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
- Goldman, A. I. 1970. A theory of human action. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall INC.
- Landman, Fred. 2000. Events and Plurality. The Jerusalem Lectures. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Some References

- Löbner, S. 2017. Frame theory with first-order comparators: modeling the lexical meaning of punctual verbs of change with frames. In H. H. Hansen, S. E. Murray, M. Sadrzadeh, H. Zeevat (Eds.), Logic, Language, and Computa-tion. 11th International Tbilisi Symposium, pp. 98-117. Heidelberg, New York: Springer.
- Löbner, S. manuscript. Cascades. Goldman's level-generation, multilevel categorization of action, and verb semantics. https://sfb991.uni-duesseldorf.de/fileadmin/Vhosts/ SFB991/b09/Loebner_Cascades_July_2018.pdf
- Petersen, W. 2007. Representation of Concepts as Frames. In: Complex Cognition and Qualitative Science, Jurgis Skilters, Fiorenza Toccafondi and Gerhard Stemberger (eds.), The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, 2, p. 151-170. University of Latvia. 28